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ABSTRACT
Classifying and Cataloging Cyber-Security Incidents
Within Cyber-Physical Systems
William B. Miller
School of Technology, BYU
Master of Science
In the past, there were perceived delineations between the cyber world and the physical
world. We are becoming increasingly aware of the overlap between these two worlds, and the
overlap itself is increasing. The overlap between these two worlds is known as cyber-physical
systems.
There have been several incidents involving cyber-physical systems and the number of
these incidents is increasing dramatically. In the past there has been no effort to identify
methods for describing these incidents in the unique context of cyber-physical systems.
This research provides a taxonomy for classifying these incidents that focuses on cross
domain, impact oriented analysis. A repository for information about these incidents has also
been created as part of this research.

Keywords: William Miller, cyber-physical systems, cyber-security, incident, taxonomy,
database
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1

INTRODUCTION

In today’s world, there is an increasing overlap between the cyber world and the physical
world. We are seeing increasing numbers of “things” that are being controlled by computers.
These “things” are also being connected to each other in ways that have never been seen before.
These types of “things” include large scale industrial control systems that manage our critical
infrastructure such as power plants, manufacturing, and transportation systems. They also include
vehicles, medical devices, home automation systems, and smartphones and other mobile devices.
Figure 1-1 illustrates how cyber systems and physical systems overlap in cyber-physical systems.
This overlap is increasing as we continue to look for new ways to control the physical world
(Rajkumar et al. 2010).

Cyber
Systems

Cyberphysical
Systems

Physical
Systems

Figure 1-1: Cyber-Physical Systems
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These cyber-physical systems present security challenges that are similar in many ways to
purely cyber systems, but there are also some areas where the challenges are unique to cyberphysical systems.

1.1

Problem
In 2012, an attempt was made to identify some of the security incidents within critical

infrastructure systems (Miller and Rowe 2012). In making this attempt it was discovered that the
problems presented in securing our critical infrastructure are more pronounced than was initially
understood. Three key issues were identified as this analysis was attempted. First, the issues
related to attacks on critical infrastructure are present in the broader realm of all Cyber-Physical
Systems (CPS). Figure 1-2 demonstrates how critical infrastructure is a subset of CPS as a whole.
Second, the taxonomies currently in use do not sufficiently describe incidents within the realm of
CPS due to their focus on purely cyber systems. Finally, it was discovered that there is not a
current public source of information about these incidents.

Cyber Physical
Systems

Critical Infrastructure

Figure 1-2: Critical Infrastructure as a sub-set of Cyber-Physical Systems
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One of the heightened risks with cyber-attacks against critical infrastructure is the physical
component to these attacks. An attack in this area is not limited to information or processes. The
physical components of these systems suggest that any impact on the information also has a
possibility of causing an impact within the physical world. While the impact on physical systems
is obvious and well publicized for ICS and SCADA systems, it is not limited to these types of
systems. There are many other systems that have a presence in the cyber world and the physical
world at the same time. While many incidents within critical infrastructure may be on a large
scale, an incident on a smaller CPS is no less impactful to those involved. For example, an incident
in a medical CPS could be fatal for those involved. All types of CPSs should be included in these
efforts to protect the infrastructure.
There are several incident taxonomies currently available to classify cyber-security
incidents. There are some that focus on the nature of an attack, while others describe the defensive
posture of the victim. There are also some that attempt to detail the impact of the attack. All of
these taxonomies contain weaknesses when attempting to apply them to incidents involving a
CPS. For example, the taxonomy developed by Howard and Longstaff describes how an attack
was carried out along with the informational target of an attack and resultant effects. This
taxonomy does not consider the entity where the attack occurred (Howard and Longstaff 1998).
The AVOIDIT taxonomy is another example of a taxonomy that is focused on how an attack was
carried out with no consideration for the entity where the attack occurred (Simmons et al. 2009).
Blackwell’s taxonomy describes the defensive posture of the victim of an attack also without
describing the entity that was the victim (Blackwell 2010). The taxonomy presented by Kjaerland
describes the entity where the attack occurred and the informational effects of the attack
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(Kjaerland 2006). None of these taxonomies account for the physical effects of an attack. They
also do not account for incidents that may not be a targeted attack.
The taxonomies that are focused on the nature of an attack are adequate if the goal is to
understand how an attack was carried out, but these taxonomies do not account for the impact of
an attack on the target or other victims that may not be directly targeted. Further, focusing on the
means of an attack does not account for incidents that do not stem from a malicious attack, but
still cause an impact to people and to the system.
A taxonomy that focuses on the defensive posture of the victim is helpful in understanding
what weaknesses were present in the defenses of a victim, but these taxonomies are also
inadequate in describing the impact of an incident, or dealing with incidents that do not involve a
malicious attack.
Taxonomies that attempt to detail the impact of an attack also suffer from many
weaknesses, especially in dealing with CPS incidents. These taxonomies are typically focused on
the impact to information in an attack. They do not contemplate the physical impacts that occur
within CPS incidents. These taxonomies are also focused on an attack and do not consider
incidents that do not fall under the category of an attack yet have an impact on people, property
or the system.
The ability to classify incidents within a CPS is only one part of the problem. A repository
of information about the incidents that have occurred that is available for academic research would
facilitate the ability to study these incidents and devise methods to prevent future incidents.
There are industry incident databases that detail all incidents whether there is a cybercomponent or not. These databases are designed for members of the industry and are not available
for academic research without incurring significant costs (RISI 2014). There are also cyber-
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security incident databases, but these do not address the physical components of an incident within
a CPS (US-CERT 2014). A method of cataloging incidents within a CPS that is freely available
for academic research would enhance the ability to protect these systems in the future.
A cross domain, impact oriented classification system and database are needed to facilitate
better research into the nature and impact of these types of incidents. This would allow researchers
to be able to identify the similarities in incidents as well as understand the impacts across multiple
sectors of cyber-physical systems.

1.2

Research Questions
This research attempted to answer the following questions:
•

Q1. What taxonomy categories will allow for cross domain analysis of incidents?

•

Q2. What taxonomy categories will allow for an impact oriented analysis of incidents?

•

H1. Suitable methods for measuring the impact of an incident currently exist.

•

H2. Currently available methods can be adapted for use in CPS incidents.

•

Q3. What are the identifiable benefits of a cross domain classification system?

•

Q4. What are the identifiable benefits of an impact oriented classification system?

1.2.1

Taxonomy Categories
There are differing ideas on how to classify cyber-security incidents in general. These

differences also extend to incidents within a CPS. Some classification systems focus on the
method of attack, others focus on the defensive posture of the victim. There are classification
systems that attempt to be general purpose systems that can be used in any type of incident, while
others are more narrowly defined and only apply to specific use cases. For example, there are
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classification systems that describe specific methods of attack, or that are only applicable to a
specific industry (US-CERT 2014; RISI 2014; OWASP).
With so many classification systems already available, some may question the need for a
new system. All of these classification systems are applicable in the realm in which they were
intended to be used, but when it comes to studying incidents within a CPS, we need a classification
that allows for cross domain analysis. This system should be able to describe incidents within
utility systems, health care systems, transportation systems, and any other domains that may
involve a CPS.
The domain in which a CPS operates is not the only unique characteristic when studying
incidents within a CPS. Incidents within a CPS have real world impacts. These impacts must be
quantified in order to form a complete analysis of this type of an incident. This research will also
identify the taxonomy categories that will allow for this type of impact oriented analysis.

1.2.2

Suitable Methods for Measuring the Impact of an Incident
There are currently methods for measuring the impact of purely physical incidents. These

methods are generally associated with the security industry. This research will attempt to use these
existing methods to describe the impact of a CPS incident.

1.2.3

Identifiable Benefits
This research attempts to create a method for cross domain, impact oriented analysis of

incidents within a CPS. As part of this research, an attempt is made to identify the benefits of this
type of analysis in contrast to existing approaches. The research attempts to identify what benefits
may be achieved by this type of research that are not available in already existing methods of
analyzing incidents.
6

1.3

Definitions
The following terms will be useful to understand when reading this thesis:
Critical Infrastructure – The systems that support and sustain society. Including utilities,

transportation, and communications.
Cyber Component – The computing component of a CPS.
Cyber-physical System (CPS) – A system where technology intersects with the physical
world.
Cyber-security Incident – An event in a system that causes an unauthorized impact to
the system. This could be a targeted attack, an incidental attack, or an accident.
Hacktivist – An individual or group that utilizes unauthorized computer access and
disruptive actions to achieve political or social goals.
Impact – The effect of a Cyber-security Incident. Both direct and indirect impacts are
considered.
Industrial Control System (ICS) – A type of CPS designed to control industrial
processes.
Market Sector – The industry or area in which a CPS is used.
Means – How a cyber-security incident occurred. This may describe the methods used by
an attacker or the circumstances that lead to an accident.
Source Type – A description of the entity were a Cyber-security Incident originated.
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) – An implementation of ICS that
is used in much of the critical infrastructure.
Taxonomy – An ordered classification system.
Victim Type – A description of the entity where a cyber-security incident occurred.
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1.4

Delimitations
This research has been limited by the following constraints. This research has classified

and cataloged cyber-security incidents involving cyber-physical systems. This research has not
attempted a classification of broader cyber-security incidents. This research has also been limited
to incidents that involve both cyber and physical components. An attempt has not been made to
classify or catalog incidents that contain only a cyber-component or only a physical component.
For example, an incident that strictly focuses on stealing corporate secrets would not be included
in this research. At the same time, an incident that strictly involved the failure of physical
components has also not been included.
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2

2.1

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction
A review of literature on cyber-physical systems is undertaken to document the current

understanding of what constitutes a CPS and the unique challenges that are faced when identifying
incidents in this area. There is also a discussion of currently available incident taxonomies to
understand their uses and applicability to a CPS. This review includes examples of incidents
within a CPS. Finally, a review of incident databases is undertaken in order to understand their
availability and applicability to a CPS.

2.2

Cyber-Physical Systems
In modern society, we are seeing the increasing intersection of two formerly separate

worlds. The intersection of the cyber world with the physical world is growing at a rapid pace
(Poovendran 2010). These areas of intersection are known as a cyber-physical system (CPS)
(Rajkumar et al. 2010). These systems provide a new set of challenges when it comes to
preventing and responding to incidents. In the past, a cyber-security incident focused on the
information that was involved in the incident. Now, we must also account for the physical impact
that may occur from an incident. This impact may include property damage, disruption of services,
or even serious injury or death.
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2.2.1

Cyber-Physical Systems Characteristics
There is no clear-cut definition of what a CPS is. Rather, a CPS is more easily defined by

its characteristics (Helps and Mensah 2012). The major characteristic of a CPS is its physical
aspect. This physical aspect includes components such as sensors and actuators that are controlled
by some form of computer system. This may be a large scale system such as Supervisory Control
and Data Acquisition (SCADA) or a small system such as a smart phone or tablet.
In 2010, Radha Poovendran attempted to explain the CPS space. Poovendran discussed
the emerging trends in the physical world, cyber-physical systems of today and tomorrow,
complex interface and interactions between cyber and physical worlds, grand challenges and
solutions in CPS, and the future of CPS community effort (Poovendran 2010).
Poovendran explains some of the emerging trends in the physical world. One of these
trends is the increase in human mobility. During the 20th century, advances in transportation
increased the distances humans could travel and decreased the time it would take to travel those
distances. These advances even included placing a man on the moon (Poovendran 2010). Many
of these advances in how we interact with the physical world were due to developments in cyberphysical systems. At that time, and continuing today, humans experience difficulties in their
interactions with the physical world. For example, despite great advances in automotive
technology, many still are injured or killed in accidents each year (Poovendran 2010).
There are many advancements taking place in the area of CPSs. Improvements in both the
cyber and physical sectors are rapidly converging to create highly collaborative systems that are
able to react to and control elements within the physical world. Poovendran argues that existing
systems are capable of much greater interactions between the cyber and physical worlds.
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Poovendran anticipates that in the future CPSs will become more integrally involved in several
sectors of the economy (Poovendran 2010).
Poovendran also comments on the complexities of interaction between the cyber and
physical worlds. The nature of the world is complex, parallel, continuous, and dynamically
changing with many things happening at the same time. In the cyber world, there are discrete
states and asynchronous interactions. These differences make the interactions between the cyber
and physical worlds more complex. This interaction is particularly alarming due to the fact that
human lives are affected by CPSs (Poovendran 2010).
There are many advances that need to be made in order to realize the true potential of
CPSs. Poovendran notes there needs to be a dramatic increase in the ability to design for cyber
and physical interactions at the same time. A CPS must also be able to quickly adapt to the
constantly changing environment of the physical world. There also need to be changes to the
education of engineers, computer programmers, and information technology professionals to
manage the increasing complexity of CPSs. This educational change will require crossdisciplinary studies to provide the necessary understanding of all aspects of CPSs (Poovendran
2010).
Ragunathan Rajkumar and others also wrote about the characteristics of a CPS in 2010.
They discussed the grand challenges and vision of CPSs, scientific foundations and challenges,
and the social impact and infrastructure of CPSs. They also discussed the need for non-technical
people to be able to interact with a CPS (Rajkumar et al. 2010).
Rajkumar et al. present several examples of what they term as the grand challenges and
vision of CPSs. The first example is an advanced electric power grid. One of the current
challenges of the power grid is that a failure in one part of the system may have a cascading effect
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that influences other parts of the system. This was evident in the 2003 Midwest blackout in the
United States. Another challenge of the current power grid is the rapidly increasing introduction
of renewable energy sources. Some of these sources, such as wind power, do not produce a regular
power stream as is expected with traditional power sources. These challenges lead to the vision
of an advanced power grid based on CPS technologies that is more robust and resilient to failures
(Rajkumar et al. 2010). Figure 2-1 represents the advanced power grid envisioned by
Rajkumar et al.

Figure 2-1: Vision of Advanced Power Grid

Another vision for CPSs that is presented is to aid the protection of our natural
environment. Rajkumar et al. propose a vast network of sensors and actuators that is capable of
providing fine-grained real-time data about environmental conditions. This network would
drastically change the way scientific data is gathered and analyzed (Rajkumar et al. 2010).
The next area discussed is in disaster response or large-scale evacuations. The authors
envision a large-scale managed transportation system that combines road, air, and rail traffic. This
12

system could be used to coordinate large scale evacuations and more effectively utilize available
resources (Rajkumar et al. 2010).
The final vision discussed concerns assistive devices. The authors envision devices that
could aid the elderly or disabled with many of their daily tasks. These devices would be mostly
autonomous, but would allow for voice commands or remote commands from a health care
professional or family member. These types of devices would require levels of trust that do not
currently exist with devices and communication channels (Rajkumar et al. 2010).
One of the issues with CPSs is the interconnected nature of these systems. Many CPSs
were designed to be isolated systems. This is especially true of industrial control and SCADA
systems. With the advent of the internet, many of these formerly isolated systems have been
connected in ways that were never imagined by their designers. Many SCADA systems now have
web based monitoring and control systems. These systems are even capable of being controlled
by a mobile phone (Ozdemir and Karacor 2006).

2.3

Incident Taxonomies
There are many methods of classifying cyber-security incidents. Some have proposed

general taxonomies that can be used for any incident. Others have proposed more specific
taxonomies that deal with a particular type of incident or a specific type of target.

2.3.1

General Taxonomies
There have been many attempts to define a system for classifying cyber-attacks or

incidents. These began as attempts to identify software vulnerabilities that could be compromised
to form an attack. In 1998, Howard and Longstaff presented the first attempt at a unified security
taxonomy. This taxonomy attempted to define an attack based on the tool used, the vulnerability
13

exploited, the action taken, the target, and the unauthorized result (Howard and Longstaff 1998).
Figure 2-2 presents Howard and Longstaff’s incident taxonomy.

Figure 2-2: Howard and Longstaff's Incident Taxonomy

Howard and Longstaff begin their taxonomy by defining an event. An event comprises an
action and a target. An event does not necessarily denote anything malicious or unwanted. There
are thousands of legitimate events each day such as a user logging in to their account. There are
other events that may be unwanted that still do not signify an attack.
An attack as defined by Howard and Longstaff is “a series of steps taken by an attacker to
achieve an unauthorized result” (Howard and Longstaff 1998). This “series of steps” is broken
down into the tool the attacker uses, the vulnerability that is exploited, the action that is performed
on a target (event), and the unauthorized result that is desired. In essence, “An attacker uses a tool
14

to exploit a vulnerability to perform an action on a target in order to achieve an unauthorized
result” (Howard and Longstaff 1998).
An attack may be part of a group of attacks that can be classed together for some reason.
These groups of attacks are termed incidents. Howard and Longstaff define an incident as “a group
of attacks that can be distinguished from other attacks because of the distinctiveness of the
attackers, attacks, objectives, sites, and timing” (Howard and Longstaff 1998).
There have been other attempts at defining incident taxonomies. Most of these have been
extensions of the taxonomy created by Howard and Longstaff. In 2006, Maria Kjaerland proposed
a taxonomy that included the source and target sectors along with the method of operations and
the impact to the target (Kjaerland 2006).
Kjaerland describes an attack in terms of Source Sectors, MO, Impact, and Target Sectors.
Source Sectors is the source of an incident and is meant to describe the attacker. MO is the method
of operation in how the attack was carried out. Impact describes the results of the attack and how
the target was affected. Target Sectors describe the victim of the attack (Kjaerland 2006). Figure
2-3 presents Kjaerland’s incident taxonomy.

Figure 2-3: Kjaerland's Incident Taxonomy

Kjaerland described the Source Sectors as Com, Gov, Edu, Intl, User, and Unknown. The
MO or method of operation contained Misuse of Resources, User Compromise, Root
15

Compromise, Social Engineering, Virus, Web Compromise, Trojan, Worm, Recon, and Denial of
Service. The options for Impact include Disrupt, Distort, Destruct, Disclosure, and Unknown. The
Target Sectors listed by Kjaerland are Com and Gov (Kjaerland 2006).
Clive Blackwell also extended Howard and Longstaff’s taxonomy in 2010. This extension
focused on the defensive posture of the victim of an attack. Where Howard and Longstaff focused
on the objectives of the attacker, Blackwell attempts to understand the ultimate effect on the target
(Blackwell 2010).
Blackwell makes several significant changes to the terminology used by Howard and
Longstaff. Blackwell uses the term perpetrator rather than attacker in order to differentiate
between intended and unintended consequences. According to Blackwell, an attacker always
intends to cause harm where a perpetrator may not be intending to cause harm, but harm may be
caused by external factors (Blackwell 2010).
Blackwell also adapts the concept of an event. Rather than tying an incident to a single
event, Blackwell ties an incident to stages that may be composed of one or more events with a
common purpose. This concept of stages also allows Blackwell to account for the different parts
of an incident. These parts include “accessing the system, using the targeted resource, and
escaping without detection” (Blackwell 2010).
The next modification proposed by Blackwell is to use the term method rather than tool.
By using the term method, Blackwell is able to account for the knowledge and abilities of the
perpetrator along with the actual tools that were used. This term is complementary with
Kjaerland’s use of the term “Method of Operation (Blackwell 2010; Kjaerland 2006).
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Blackwell also differentiates between the immediate effect of an attack and the ultimate
effect. This is an important distinction because the long-term effects of an attack are often more
serious than the immediate effect (Blackwell 2010).
Blackwell goes on to describe the defensive posture of the victim of an attack and how it
relates to the attacker. Table 2-1 presents Blackwell’s comparison of offensive and defensive
categories as they relate to an incident (Blackwell 2010).

Table 2-1: Blackwell's Comparison of Offensive and Defensive Categories

Offensive Categories
Perpetrator

Defensive Categories
Defender and third party victim

Objective

Positive objective to achieve goals
Negative objective to avoid incidents

Method
Threat
Agent
Action
Immediate target
Immediate effect
Intended ultimate target
Ultimate effect for perpetrator

Positive method and negative control
Vulnerability
Employee or service provider
Positive action and control reaction
Immediate target
Immediate effect
Ultimate affected target valuable to the defense
Ultimate effect on defender and third party
victims

Kjaerland’s taxonomy was used in creating a survey of attacks against Critical
Infrastructure in 2012 (Miller and Rowe 2012). This effort brought to light some of the challenges
of using these types of taxonomies to describe incidents within a CPS.
A different approach to creating a taxonomy was taken by Hansman and Hunt. In this
taxonomy, attacks are classified in four dimensions. The first dimension classifies the attack
vector. The attack vector is the means by which an attack is carried out. The basic attack vectors
are defined as Virus, Worm, Trojan, Buffer Overflow, Denial of Service, Network Attack,
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Physical Attack, Password Attack, and Information Gathering Attack. These attack vectors can
be further classified based on the specific methods utilized in the attack (Hansman and Hunt
2005).
The second dimension defined in this taxonomy describes the target of an attack. This
dimension is broken down by hardware or software targets. Hardware targets are further described
based on the type of hardware. This could include processors, network equipment, or peripheral
devices. Software targets are classified as either Operating System or Application. These are
further defined all the way down to specific versions of the software that was targeted (Hansman
and Hunt 2005).
The third dimension covers the vulnerabilities and exploits that are used by the attack. The
authors do not define the categories to be used in this dimension. Rather, the Common
Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) database is used for classification purposes (“CVE Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)”).
The fourth dimension defined by Hansman and Hunt deals with payloads or effects beyond
the initial attack vector. These are classified as payloads that are themselves a first dimension
attack vector, corruption of information, disclosure of information, theft of service, or subversion.
Other than payloads that are themselves an attack vector, the other categories were all previously
defined by Howard and Longstaff. Hansman and Hunt admit that their taxonomy is not
comprehensive and thus they allow for additions in any of the four domains they have specified.
They also allow for more domains to be added as necessary (Hansman and Hunt 2005).
Another taxonomy was presented by Simmons et al. This taxonomy was given the name
AVOIDIT based on its classification categories. These categories are Attack Vector, Operational
Impact, Defense, Informational Impact, and Target. This taxonomy draws on many of the same
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concepts as Howard and Longstaff and Kjaerland. The author’s stated goal is to develop “a
complete useful taxonomy” (Simmons et al. 2009).
The Attack Vector as defined in the AVOIDIT taxonomy would more properly be labeled
Exploited Vulnerability. The authors make no attempt to define how the attack was carried out.
Rather, they are more interested in the vulnerabilities within the system that were exploited in the
attack. The categories listed within Attack Vector include Misconfiguration, Design Flaws,
Kernel Flaws, Buffer Overflow, Race Condition, and Incorrect Permission among others
(Simmons et al. 2009).
The Operational Impact in the AVOIDIT taxonomy is a description of the methods used
by the attacker. This class includes Misuse of Resources, User Compromise, Root Compromise,
Web Compromise, Installed Malware, and Denial of Service. These categories are designed to be
mutually exclusive and easily presented to and understood by the public (Simmons et al. 2009).
The Defense category defines the Mitigation and Remediation efforts a defender might
employ both before and after an attack. The mitigation efforts refer to steps taken by a defender
before an attack in an attempt to prevent a successful attack. The remediation efforts are those
steps taken to correct the situation during or after an attack (Simmons et al. 2009).
Informational Impact refers to the impact an attack has on the informational aspects of a
system. These impacts include Distort, Disrupt, Destruct, Disclosure, and Discovery.
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Figure 2-4: AVOIDIT Incident Taxonomy

The target of an attack, as defined by AVOIDIT, is where in the system the attack takes
place. This could include the Operating System, Network, User, or Application. These different
targets could leave a defender unknowingly susceptible to another attack. Figure 2-4 represents
the AVOIDIT taxonomy (Simmons et al. 2009).
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2.3.2

Specific Taxonomies
Aside from the general taxonomies, there are also taxonomies that deal with specific

aspects of a cyber-attack. Some of these taxonomies focus on the type of system that is being
attacked; others focus on the type of attack that is being carried out.
A taxonomy of cyber-attacks on SCADA systems was presented in 2011 (Zhu, Joseph,
and Sastry 2011). This taxonomy describes some of the differences a SCADA system has from a
typical IT network. Some of these differences include a difference in the priorities of system
protection. In a SCADA system, integrity and availability are typically of greater concern than
confidentiality. In a typical IT network, it is usually the central servers that are the primary
concern in an attack, but in a SCADA system, the end nodes are of equal concern because this is
where the physical aspects of the system are contained. There are also protocol differences that
must be accounted for in an attack on a SCADA system (Zhu, Joseph, and Sastry 2011). While
the title of the paper was “A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems,” an actual
taxonomy was never presented.
Along with the taxonomies that focus on the type of system that is under attack, there are
also taxonomies that deal with the type of attack being carried out. In 2003, a taxonomy was
presented to detail attacks carried out utilizing computer worms. This taxonomy focused on five
key attributes of computer worms. These areas are Target Discovery, Carrier, Activation,
Payloads, and Attackers. Target Discovery defines how a worm identifies new targets for
infection. The Carrier is the method the worm uses propagate onto a target. Activation describes
how the worm begins operating on the target. Payloads are the non-propagating parts of the worm
that carry out the attackers intended purposes. Attackers attempts to define the motives which
drive the attackers and their choice of payloads (Weaver et al. 2003).
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Another of this type of taxonomy attempts to describe Distributed Denial of Service
(DDoS) attacks and defense mechanisms. This taxonomy defines DDoS attacks by Degree of
Automation, Exploited Weakness to Deny Service, Source Address Validity, Attack Rate
Dynamics, Possibility of Characterization, Persistence of Agent Set, Victim Type, and Impact on
Victim (Mirkovic and Reiher 2004). Figure 2-5 illustrates the DDoS attack taxonomy.

Figure 2-5: DDoS Attack Taxonomy

Every taxonomy contains strengths and weaknesses. Taxonomies are generally useful
within the realm where they are designed to be used, but they present challenges when attempting
to describe something that was not intended to be described by the taxonomy. This is the reason
why all of these taxonomies have difficulties in describing incidents within a CPS. There are no
currently available taxonomies to describe these types of incidents.
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2.4

Examples of Incidents
Incidents such as the SQL Slammer worm infection at the Davis-Besse nuclear power

plant and the Stuxnet attack on the Iranian nuclear facility at Natanz have made it clear that more
needs to be done to protect our critical infrastructure. Most of the focus has been on Industrial
Control Systems (ICS) particularly Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems.
This is a reasonable place to start. There are, however, other incidents that have affected other
areas within a CPS. A few examples of these types of incidents will be useful in understanding
the relationship between incidents in the broader realm of CPSs.

2.4.1

Hospital Malware
Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center in Boston has 664 pieces of medical equipment that

run on older versions of the Microsoft Windows Operating System. The manufacturers of this
equipment will not allow the hospital to modify the systems even to install anti-virus software
because of disagreements over whether modifications could run afoul of U.S. Food and Drug
Administration regulatory reviews. This equipment is often infected with malware, and one or
two devices have to be taken out of service each week to be cleaned of these infections. These
infections and the resultant down-time compromise the quality of care hospital patients receive.
If the wrong piece of equipment were compromised at a critical time, the consequences could be
disastrous (Talbot 2012).

2.4.2

Airport Hack
In March 1997, one hacker penetrated and disabled a telephone company computer that

serviced Worcester Airport in Massachusetts. As a result, the telephone service to the Federal
Aviation Administration control tower, the airport fire department, airport security, the weather
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service, and various private airfreight companies was cut off for six hours. Later in the day, the
juvenile disabled another telephone company computer, this time causing an outage in the Rutland
area. The outage caused financial losses and threatened public health and public safety (Denning
2000).

2.4.3

Pipeline Explosion
In June 1999, 237,000 gallons of gasoline leaked from a 16-inch pipeline into a creek that

flowed through Whatcom Falls Park in Bellingham, Washington. About 1½ hours after the
rupture, the gasoline ignited and burned approximately 1½ miles along the creek causing three
deaths and eight documented injuries. The pipeline failure was exacerbated by control systems
not able to perform control and monitoring functions. The National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) report issued October 2002 cited one of the five key causes of the accident was the
Olympic Pipe Line Company’s practice of performing database development work on the
SCADA system while the system was being used to operate the pipeline (Tsang 2012).

2.4.4

Summary
Each of these incidents has unique characteristics that set them apart from the others. They

also have characteristics in common that can be compared and used to help prevent further
incidents. The major characteristic each of these incidents has in common is the potential for
impact on human lives. This potential to impact the physical world is one of the key features of
cyber-physical systems.
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2.5

Incident Repositories
A classification system is useful for providing a standardized method for studying an

incident; this method, however, is not as useful as it could be if there is no way to compare
incidents to find their similarities and differences. There are many incident databases available,
but none of the currently available databases are useful for making this type of comparison. There
are general incident databases that attempt to catalog all cyber-security incidents, but these
databases do not contain the information that would be specific to CPSs, and many of them are
no longer being updated (Sveen et al. 2007). There are also databases that detail security incidents
relating only to specific systems.

2.5.1

General Repositories
An example of a general repository is the US-CERT database (US-CERT 2014). This

database focuses more on vulnerabilities than incidents. This database has no regard for CPSs and
considers a limited range of market sectors as can be seen in Figure 2-6. This database is also US
centric with no discussion of incidents in other locations.

Figure 2-6: US-CERT Sectors

There are other issues with relying on the US-CERT database as a repository for CPS
incidents. For example, when specifying the primary purpose of the affected system, only a

25

limited range of options are available. These options are not updated for newer technologies. This
limitation can be seen in Figure 2-7.

Figure 2-7: US-CERT System Purposes

These issues, along with others, limit the usefulness of the US-CERT incident database
for cataloging incidents relating to CPSs. There is a need for a repository that is focused on the
unique aspects of CPSs and is international in scope.

2.5.2

Specific Repositories
There are also incident databases that focus on specific types of incidents. The main

repository that relates to CPSs is the Repository of Industrial Security Incidents (RISI 2014). RISI
is designed to “collect, investigate, analyze, and share important industrial security incidents
among member companies so they can learn from experiences of others” (RISI 2014). RISI began
as the Industrial Security Incident Database (ISID) in 2001. ISID was discontinued in 2006. In
2009, the Security Incidents Organization™ was created to operate RISI (RISI 2014).
RISI provides many of the classification categories that are needed to describe CPS
incidents. For example, RISI provides classifications for Incident Type, Incident Perpetrator,
Incident Results, Financial Impact, and Downtime. These categories can be seen in figures 2-8
through 2-12 (RISI 2014).
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RISI has three general classifications for incident type. Each of these has multiple subclassifications. The general classifications are Accidental, External, and Internal. RISI does not
use a hierarchical selection for incident type; rather, the options are presented in a single list.
These options can be seen in Figure 2-8.

Figure 2-8: RISI Incident Types

As can be seen, the Accidental incident types refer mainly to component failures and other
incidental events. The External incident types are more closely related to the incident means or
attacks as referred to in the available taxonomies. The Internal incident types refer to malicious
behavior by an internal employee. There are also options for Audit, Control System Failure, Other,
and Unknown incidents.
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The Incident Perpetrator, as defined by RISI, contains Insider and Outsider perpetrators.
As with the incident type, each of these has several sub-classifications. These options can be seen
in Figure 2-9.

Figure 2-9: RISI Incident Perpetrators

The Incident results portion of RISI is a selection list of results from the perspective of the
entity where the incident occurred. The Incident results include options for equipment damage or
loss, loss of time in both production and staff time, theft of intellectual property, public effects
(both human and property), monetary damages (fraud or fines), and communication failures.
These results can be seen in Figure 2-10.
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Figure 2-10: RISI Incident Results

The financial impact as reported in RISI is a range in US dollars. It is not clear whether
this impact is just for the entity where the incident occurred, or if it includes financial impacts to
other entities. This can be seen in Figure 2-11.
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Figure 2-11: RISI Financial Impact

The downtime as reported in RISI is in ranges of hours. This could be from zero downtime
to greater than 72 hours. This is shown in Figure 2-12.

Figure 2-12: RISI Downtime
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As with US-CERT, there are some problems with RISI as it relates to CPSs. RISI is
focused on Industrial Control Systems. These systems are a critical piece of the CPS space, but
there are many other types of systems within the CPS realm that are not accounted for by RISI.
RISI is also designed for use by members of industry. As such, RISI charges thousands of US
dollars per year for access to the repository. This is problematic when attempting to find
information about these types of incidents for other types of research.
The issues with US-CERT and RISI demonstrate the need for a new incident repository
that is focused on CPS incidents. This repository should allow for cross-domain analysis of
incidents and should be freely available for academic research to take advantage of the benefits
obtainable from collaboration between a wide and diverse pool of researches and cyber-security
professionals.

2.6

Chapter Summary
There are many conflicting definitions of what constitutes a CPS. These ideas range from

large scale industrial control systems to small systems such as smart phones or tablets. The best
way to describe a CPS is to focus on the shared characteristics. In its simplest form, a CPS can
generally be considered to be the interface between the cyber world and the physical world.
There have been many attempts at creating a taxonomy to describe cyber-security
incidents. These taxonomies may focus on how the incident was carried out, how the incident was
defended against, or what the impact of the incident was. All of the existing taxonomies have
weaknesses when trying to describe incidents within CPSs. There is a need for a new taxonomy
that accounts for the unique characteristics of CPSs and the challenges that CPSs present.
Attempts have also been made in creating incident repositories to allow for the study of
cyber-security incidents. These repositories face some of the same challenges with CPSs as the
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incident taxonomies. In addition to the difficulties of accounting for the unique characteristics of
CPSs, some of these repositories cost a significant amount to be able to access and are not
available for academic research.
The challenges presented by CPSs along with the lack of currently available taxonomies
and incident repositories are a hindrance for researchers attempting to study these types of security
incidents and find better methods of protection to avoid incidents in the future. A cross domain,
impact oriented classification system and database are needed to facilitate better research into the
nature and impact of these types of incidents.
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3

3.1

METHODOLOGY

Introduction
This research will produce a framework for studying CPS incidents. This framework will

also be used to answer the research questions and test the hypotheses presented in Chapter 1. This
framework will consist of an incident taxonomy, a reporting workflow, a website and a database.
A validation study will also be conducted as part of this research. Using the framework as part of
the research will allow the research questions to be answered and the hypotheses to be tested
within the context in which they are intended to be used long term.

3.2

Taxonomy Categories
Q1 “What taxonomy categories will allow for cross domain analysis of incidents?” and

Q2 “What taxonomy categories will allow for an impact oriented analysis of incidents?” shall be
answered as follows. A working group of CPS and cyber-security researchers shall be formed.
This group will provide an initial Delphi study using a modified version of Kjaerland’s taxonomy
(Miller and Rowe 2012) as a starting point to define the categories necessary for an incident
taxonomy that focuses on CPSs. This initial taxonomy is presented in Table 3-1.
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Table 3-1: Initial Taxonomy

Source Sectors
Com
Gov
Edu
Intl
User
Unknown

Method of
Operation(MO)
Misuse of Resources
User Compromise
Root Compromise
Social Engineering
Virus
Web Compromise
Trojan
Worm
Recon
Denial of Service
Other Sys Failure

Impact

Target Sectors

Disrupt
Distort
Destruct
Disclosure
Death
Unknown

Com
Gov
Intl

The group will develop a list of categories that are required for a taxonomy that describes
CPS incidents.

3.2.1

Taxonomy Refinement
After the initial taxonomy is created, it will be presented to the steering group for further

refinement and clarification. The group will utilize an affinity diagram technique to analyze and
categorize comments on the taxonomy. The results of that exercise will then be used to create the
final taxonomy.

3.3

Methods for Measuring Impact
H1 “Suitable methods for measuring the impact of an incident currently exist.” shall be

tested through a literature survey to identify current methods for measuring the impact of an
incident. This survey will not be limited to cyber-security methods for measuring impact, but will
also draw from other disciplines. H2 “Currently available methods can be adopted for use in CPS
incidents.” shall be tested through the taxonomy refinement process already described.
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3.4

Identifiable Benefits
Q3 “What are the identifiable benefits of a cross domain classification system?” and Q4

“What are the identifiable benefits of an impact oriented classification system?” shall be answered
as follows. The identifiable benefits of this method of classification will be determined by using
the taxonomy to classify several incidents. This will be done through the creation of a database of
incidents. The database will be created to follow the specifications of the incident taxonomy.
Several incidents will then be added to this database with their classifications. These
incidents will be gathered using a literature survey. Incidents involving a CPS will be selected
from incident reports in academic publications, news outlets, and other information sources.
The final taxonomy will be compared to other currently existing taxonomies. This
comparison will be made using the incidents that are included in the database. Each incident will
be classified using the taxonomy presented here along with several currently existing taxonomies.
The results of this comparison will identify the benefits of utilizing a cross-domain impactoriented taxonomy for classifying incidents within a CPS.
This comparison will involve analyzing the results of the classification in different
taxonomies to identify benefits and weaknesses of the presented taxonomy.

3.5

Organization of Results
The results of this work will be presented in the following chapters. Chapter 4 will

document the evolution of the incident taxonomy. In Chapter 5, the entire proposed framework
will be presented along with analysis and observations for each of the framework components.
Chapter 6 will present conclusions drawn from this research along with recommendations for
future work.
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3.6

Validation of Results
The results will be validated utilizing the process illustrated in Figure 3-1. Several

incidents will be used to validate the results. Each incident will be discussed. A classification
based on the current taxonomy will be proposed. The classification will be validated, and the
taxonomy will be improved as needed.

Figure 3-1: Results Validation Process

Eight different incidents will be used in the validation process. Each incident will be
classified using the newly developed taxonomy along with Howard and Longstaff’s taxonomy,
Kjaerland’s taxonomy, and the AVOIDIT taxonomy. An introduction to the eight incidents will
be given here. The results of the classification exercise will be provided in Chapter 5.

3.6.1

Hospital Malware
Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center in Boston has 664 pieces of medical equipment that

run on older versions of the Microsoft Windows Operating System. The manufacturers of this
equipment will not allow the hospital to modify the systems even to install anti-virus software.
This equipment is often infected with malware, and one or two devices have to be taken out of
service each week to be cleaned of these infections. These infections and the resultant down-time
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compromise the quality of care hospital patients receive. If the wrong piece of equipment were
compromised at a critical time, the consequences could be disastrous (Talbot 2012).

3.6.2

Airport Hack
In March 1997, one hacker penetrated and disabled a telephone company computer that

serviced Worcester Airport in Massachusetts. As a result, the telephone service to the Federal
Aviation Administration control tower, the airport fire department, airport security, the weather
service, and various private airfreight companies was cut off for six hours. Later in the day, the
juvenile disabled another telephone company computer, this time causing an outage in the Rutland
area. The outage caused financial losses and threatened public health and public safety (Denning
2000).

3.6.3

Pipeline Explosion
In June 1999, 237,000 gallons of gasoline leaked from a 16-inch pipeline into a creek that

flowed through Whatcom Falls Park in Bellingham, Washington. About 1½ hours after the
rupture, the gasoline ignited and burned approximately 1½ miles along the creek causing three
deaths and eight documented injuries. The pipeline failure was exacerbated by control systems
not able to perform control and monitoring functions. The National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) report issued October 2002 cited one of the five key causes of the accident was the
Olympic Pipe Line Company’s practice of performing database development work on the
SCADA system while the system was being used to operate the pipeline (Tsang 2012).

37

3.6.4

Maroochy Water System
In Maroochy Shire, Queensland, Australia in 2000 a disgruntled ex-employee hacked into

a water control system and flooded the grounds of a hotel and a nearby river with over 264,000
gallons of raw sewage. The Maroochy Shire attack was not one attack but a whole series of attacks
over a prolonged period (Mustard 2005).

3.6.5

Train System Virus
In 2003, a computer virus named Sobig was reported to have shut down train signaling

systems in Florida, U.S. The virus was reported to have been one of the fastest spreading e-mail
attachment viruses at the time. It shut down the signaling, dispatching, and other systems at CSX
Corporation; one of the largest transportation suppliers in the U.S. While there were no major
incidents caused by this case, many trains were delayed (Nicholson et al. 2012).

3.6.6

Nuclear Power Plant Worm
The SQL Slammer Worm began infecting systems in January 2003. At this time, the worm

infected the network of a contractor doing work for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant. The
worm spread through a T1 line between the contractor and the power plant’s business network.
This T1 line bypassed the plant’s firewalls. From the business network, the worm spread to the
plant’s control network and infected at least one unpatched server. The worm created network
congestion which caused the plant’s Safety Parameter Display System to crash (Poulsen 2003).

3.6.7

Stuxnet
In June 2010, it was discovered that a worm dubbed Stuxnet had struck the Iranian nuclear

facility at Natanz. Stuxnet used four ‘zero-day vulnerabilities’ (vulnerabilities previously
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unknown, so there has been no time to develop and distribute patches). The worm employs
Siemens’ default passwords to access Windows operating systems that run specific SCADA
programs. The worm would hunt down frequency-converter drives made by Fararo Paya in Iran
and Vacon in Finland. These drives were used to power centrifuges used in the concentration of
the uranium-235 isotope. Stuxnet altered the frequency of the electrical current to the drives
causing them to switch between high and low speeds for which they were not designed. This
switching caused the centrifuges to fail at a higher than normal rate (Farwell and Rohozinski
2011).

3.6.8

Cellular Network Vehicle Attack
Researchers from the University of Washington and the University of California San

Diego were able to demonstrate the capability of using the cellular network to attack vehicle
telematics systems such as GM’s OnStar or Ford’s Sync (Checkoway et al. 2011).

3.7

Production of Database
A database of incidents shall be developed as part of this research. This database will be

used to aid in the validation of the results. The database will be designed to allow incidents to be
classified according to the initial taxonomy. As the results are validated and the taxonomy is
improved, the database will be modified to follow the changes made to the taxonomy. At the
conclusion of this research, the database will be made available through a website for academic
research into CPS incidents.
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3.8

Chapter Summary
The framework that will be developed as part of this research will be used to determine

the best methods for describing incidents within CPSs. This framework will also be used to create
an incident repository that will be available for academic research into the methods and impacts
of these incidents. This framework will allow us to define the necessary categories for incident
classification, methods for measuring the impact of an incident, and the benefits of this type of
classification.
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4

4.1

TAXONOMY EVOLUTION

Introduction
This chapter will present how the CPS incident taxonomy evolved from a taxonomy used

to describe incidents in SCADA and critical infrastructure systems to one that may be used to
describe an incident in any CPS. An analysis of how the taxonomy will achieve this goal will also
be presented.

4.2

Initial Taxonomy
The initial taxonomy was a modification of Kjaerland’s taxonomy that was used to

conduct a survey of critical infrastructure incidents (Miller and Rowe 2012). The modifications
to Kjaerland’s taxonomy include adding Other Sys Failure to the Methods of Operation, Death to
the Impact, and Intl to the Target Sectors. These modifications were made in an attempt to account
for the CPS factors inherent in critical infrastructure and SCADA systems. This initial taxonomy
is presented in Table 4-1.
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Table 4-1: Initial Taxonomy
Source
Sectors

Method of
Operation (MO)

Impact

Target
Sectors

Com

Misuse of Resources

Disrupt

Com

Gov

User Compromise

Distort

Gov
Intl

Edu

Root Compromise

Destruct

Intl

Social Engineering

Disclosure

User

Virus

Death

Unknown

Web Compromise

Unknown

Trojan
Worm
Recon
Denial of Service
Other Sys Failure

4.3

Evolution
The categories as initially defined were Source, Means, Market Sector, Impact, and

Criticality. These categories were then used to create a taxonomy which was brought back to the
group for further refinement and clarification.
Each of the taxonomy categories was defined as follows.
The Source of an incident was defined as where the incident originated. The source was
divided into six possible classifications. These classifications were Commercial, Government,
Educational, Organization, Individual, and Unknown.
The Means of an incident defined how the incident occurred. The classifications for means
were Misuse of Resources, User Compromise, Root Compromise, Social Engineering, Virus,
Web Compromise, Trojan, Worm, Recon, Denial of Service, and Other System Failure.
The Market Sector was used to describe the victim of an incident. This category defined
the market a victim primarily does business in. The defined Market Sectors were Utilities,
Industrial Process Control, Health Care, Transportation, Aerospace, Military, Consumer
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Electronics, Facilities Infrastructure, Agriculture, Physical Access Control, Communications,
Construction, and Media Creation and Distribution.
The Impact category was used to define the effects of the incident on the victim. The
classifications to define Impact were Disrupt, Distort, Destroy, Disclose, Death/Serious Injury,
and Unknown.
The Criticality of an Incident was meant to describe how severe the Incident was. The
Criticality was broken into five different classifications. These classifications were
Inconvenience, Secondary Operations Affected, Primary Operations Affected, Primary
Operations Halted, and Human Life Affected.
These definitions were taken back to the research group for further discussion and
refinement. The group performed a sticky note exercise where each member of the group was
given a unique color of sticky notes. Each member of the group was then given an opportunity to
examine each of the categories and write any comments they had on one of their sticky notes and
attach it to the category. Each of the comments was reviewed as a group after each member was
given an opportunity to review each of the categories. This review of the comments was then used
to make modifications to the taxonomy.

4.4

Cross-Domain Analysis
During the process of classifying incidents, it was discovered that many incidents involved

multiple means and target market sectors. This discovery led to the creation of a taxonomy that
allows for multiple classification capabilities. The ability to classify an incident multiple times in
each taxonomy category became a necessary feature of the framework due to this discovery. The
multiple classification of target market sectors also provides the ability for cross domain analysis
of incidents utilizing this framework.
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4.5

Analysis of Findings
Several taxonomy categories were defined that allow for cross domain and impact oriented

analysis of incidents. The categories that are required for cross domain analysis are Victim Type
and Victim Market Sector. The Victim Type allows for a correlation of the general features of a
victim of a CPS incident. The victim Market Sector gives the ability to identify the interactions
between the sectors and how a single incident may involve multiple domains.
The categories that are necessary to conduct an impact oriented analysis of incidents are
Direct Impact and Indirect Impact with Impact Severity, Immediacy of Impact, Recovery Time,
and Monetary Impact as modifiers. The direct and indirect impact categories provide a view into
the impacts of an incident on the system and the surrounding environment. The modifiers provide
a method for comparing these impacts across incidents.
In the creation of the new taxonomy, different methods for measuring the severity of
impacts were consulted. These methods were drawn from health care, information assurance and
security, and physical security industries. Most methods of measuring severity relied on a scale
of severity. This scale is typically a Low/Medium/High severity scale. An example of this would
be the OWASP Risk Rating Methodology (OWASP). This scale was modified to provide severity
for primary and secondary operations.
The final proposed taxonomy is presented in Chapter 6.

4.6

Chapter Summary
The proposed taxonomy began as an attempt to describe incidents within SCADA and

critical infrastructure systems. The taxonomy was modified and refined through an iterative
process of making changes and attempting to classify several CPS incidents to find flaws and
weaknesses. The taxonomy was then updated to correct these flaws and weaknesses and several
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more incidents were classified using the new taxonomy. This process was repeated until the
taxonomy could be used to describe any CPS incident that was attempted. This process identified
the categories that are required to describe a CPS incident along with a method for describing the
impact of an incident.

45

5

PROPOSED FRAMEWORK

5.1

Introduction
The incident taxonomy is just one piece of what is needed to be able to study incidents

within CPSs. The taxonomy is one piece of a larger framework that is necessary for this type of
analysis. In this chapter, the entire framework will be presented beginning with the complete
taxonomy. This framework also includes an incident database and workflow along with a website
that will be used to make information about these incidents available to those who are studying
them.

5.2

BYU-CPS Incident Taxonomy
The final taxonomy as developed after the research group made comments and suggestions

on the initial taxonomy is presented here. The taxonomy has been designated the BYU-CPS
Incident Taxonomy. This taxonomy includes four main categories with sub-classifications and
modifiers to provide further detail. The four main categories are Source Type, Means, Impact,
and Victim. Each of these categories will be presented in further detail here.

5.2.1

Source Type
The Source Type of an incident describes the general features of the entity where an

incident originated. The Source Type is designed to group incidents into general classes by where
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they were initiated. This type of classification will allow for analysis and understanding of the
origin of incidents. The available Source Types are Commercial, Government, Educational, NonProfit Organization, Individual, Identified Group, and Unknown.
Commercial – A Commercial source type would denote that the incident originated with
a business entity of some type. The Commercial source type includes retail, manufacturing,
industrial, and service enterprises along with similar entities. No consideration is given to the size
of a commercial source.
Government – A Government source type would indicate an incident originated with
some form of national or local government.
Educational – An Educational source type would be used to describe an incident that
began in any type of educational institution. This could include academic research conducted at
an institute of higher education, or it may be an incident that originated at any level of educational
institution.
Non-Profit Organization – A Non-Profit Organization source type would be appropriate
for any registered non-profit organization. This would exclude commercial and government
institutions along with any unofficial entity.
Individual – An Individual source type is used if an incident is initiated by a single
individual. This individual could be a legitimate user of the affected system or it could be some
form of outside intruder.
Identified Group – An Identified Group source type would indicate some sort of
identifiable conglomeration that is not an official entity. This would include hacktivist groups like
Anonymous. It could also indicate an identified terrorist organization.
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Unknown – An Unknown source type would be used for incidents where the source of
the incident cannot be identified.

5.2.2

Means
The Means category is used to indicate how an incident occurred. In the case of a

deliberate attack, the Means would indicate the methods used by the attacker. It would also
describe what went wrong in the case of an unintentional failure. This category is not restricted
to one option. An incident can have as many means as are necessary to describe what happened.
The available classifications within the Means category are Misuse of Resources, Userlevel Resource Compromise, Root-level Resource Compromise, Social Engineering, Virus, Website Compromise, Trojan, Worm, Recon, Denial of Service, and Other System Failure. Each of
these classifications will be described here.
Misuse of Resources – The Misuse of Resources classification would be used to indicate
an incident that occurred due to the inappropriate use of system resources. This could include the
use of IT resources in a way that was not intended, such as the storing of unauthorized files. This
could also indicate authorized use of the system in a way that is not advisable, such as doing
software testing on a production system.
User-level Resource Compromise – A User-level Resource Compromise indicates that
an unauthorized user gained access to standard user resources on a system. Examples would
include an attacker compromising a user account on a system or a former employee utilizing
improperly terminated credentials to access a system they are no longer authorized to access.
Root-level Resource Compromise – A Root-level Resource Compromise consists of
gaining unauthorized access to administrator level privileges on a system. An example would be
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a valid user of a system performing an unauthorized privilege escalation to gain access to
administrator resources on a system.
Social Engineering – Social Engineering consists of using human interactions rather than
computer based operations to gain unauthorized access to a system. An example would be learning
details about an authorized user of a system in order to be able to guess the passwords that
individual uses on the desired system.
Virus – A virus is a piece of computer code that attaches itself to other processes in order
to gain access to carry out functions that would not normally be available to it.
Web-site Compromise – A Web-site Compromise takes advantage of vulnerabilities
within a web-site in order to gain access to the underlying system. A web-site compromise would
typically be an early step in gaining access to resources where other means could be used to further
an attack.
Trojan – A Trojan is a computer program that adds subversive elements to other computer
programs. A trojan could be used to copy sensitive data off of a system or to maintain
unauthorized access to a system that has already been compromised.
Worm – A Worm is similar to a Virus in that it attaches itself to other programs in order
to gain access to typically unavailable functions. The difference between a worm and a virus is in
the method of propagation. A worm has the capability of automatically seeking out and infecting
new targets, while a virus must rely on a user to propagate to other systems.
Recon – Recon is the act of scanning or probing a system to see what services are available
or what vulnerabilities might exist. Recon is usually a preliminary step to other methods of
intrusion, but the recon itself can sometimes cause an incident to occur.
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Denial of Service – A Denial of Service occurs when normal use of the system is limited
or halted. This may occur when a service is crashed or hung due to flaws in the way the service
operates. A denial of service may decrease access to a particular service or to an entire system.
Other System Failure – The Other System Failure classification would indicate that an
incident was caused due to a design flaw or other failure in the system. It could be due to the
failure of a component in the system, a system that was not designed for the proper capacity, or
any other failure that is not covered in one of the other classifications.

5.2.3

Impact
The impact of an incident describes what effect the incident had on the system or

surrounding environment. This category is designed to describe the effect of an incident on the
computer system, the physical system, the organization, and the community where the incident
occurred. The Impact is further divided into Direct and Indirect Impacts. The Severity of an
Impact is also considered. There are also modifiers for the Impact to describe the Immediacy of
Impact, Recovery Time, and Monetary Impact of an incident.

5.2.4

Direct Impact
The Direct Impact of an incident describes the tangible effects of an incident. The Direct

Impact is designed to show the results of an incident on the system and surrounding environment.
The classifications for Direct Impact are Service Disruption, Information Distortion, Physical
Destruction, Environmental Destruction, Information Destruction, Information Disclosure,
Death/Serious Injury, and Unknown.
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Service Disruption – A Service Disruption indicates a disturbance in the normal
operations of a system. This would include a change in access to the system or a deviation from
the normal operating conditions of the system.
Information Distortion – Information Distortion indicates a corruption of the data that is
stored within a system or the data that is acquired from the system. This could include the
inappropriate modification of file contents or a system reporting conditions other than those that
are actually present.
Physical Destruction – Physical Destruction occurs when an entire system or individual
components within the system fail to operate or are damaged physically. This would indicate an
incident caused a failure within the physical components of the system.
Environmental Destruction – Environmental Destruction indicates some sort of
destruction to the physical environment in which the system resides. This would include air
pollution, water pollution, or other types of environmental damage.
Information Destruction – Information Destruction is the deletion of information or files
from a system. This loss of information may lead to other types of impacts.
Information Disclosure – Information Disclosure is the unauthorized exposure of
information. This would include information about a system or information acquired from the
system.
Death/Serious Injury – The Death/Serious Injury classification indicates an incident
caused harm to human life.
Unknown – The Unknown classification is used when the Direct Impact of an incident
cannot be determined.
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5.2.5

Indirect Impact
The Indirect Impact of an incident includes those impacts that may not be noticeable at

first. In many cases, the indirect impact of an incident will be longer lasting than the direct impact.
The classifications within Indirect Impact are Loss of Reputation, Loss of Trust, Lost Business,
Political Repercussions, and Public Response.
Loss of Reputation – Loss of Reputation would indicate that the public image of an
incident’s victim has been tarnished.
Loss of Trust – Loss of Trust occurs when external entities no longer believe in a victim’s
ability to operate in a safe and effective manner.
Lost Business – Lost Business indicates an impact on the ability of an incident’s victim
to do business. This impact is realized either through an inability to provide or a reduction of
clients and orders based on the incident.
Political Repercussions – Political Repercussions may come about due to an incident.
These may include increased regulation, reduction of tax benefits, or other impacts that come as
a result of political processes.
Public Response – Public Response is indicated when the general public responds against
an entity as a result of an incident. Public Response may include boycotts, demonstrations, or
other actions taken by general members of the public.

5.2.6

Severity of Impact
The Severity of Impact is designed to indicate the magnitude of the impact of an incident

on the system. The severity is a modifier to the direct impact on a system. The classifications
within Severity of Impact are Inconvenience, Secondary Operations Degraded, Secondary
Operations Halted, Primary Operations Degraded, and Primary Operations Halted.
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Inconvenience – An Inconvenience indicates that an incident caused a minor disturbance
but did not have a measurable effect on any operations of the system.
Secondary Operations Degraded – The Secondary Operations Degraded classification
would be applied when operations that are ancillary to the primary function of a system are not
functioning at normal levels.
Secondary Operations Halted – The Secondary Operations Halted classification would
indicate that those ancillary functions have ceased entirely.
Primary Operations Degraded – Primary Operations Degraded would indicate that the
primary function of a system is not being performed at normal levels.
Primary Operations Halted – Primary Operations Halted would indicate that an incident
has completely debilitated a system’s ability to perform its primary function.

5.2.7

Immediacy of Impact
The Immediacy of Impact of an incident is an indicator of how it takes for the impact to

be recognized after an incident occurs. The immediacy of impact could be measured in seconds,
minutes, hours, days, or any other unit of time. The immediacy of impact does not denote an
increasing or decreasing scale of impact. Rather, it is a modifier of the impact to allow for a better
understanding of how long it takes to for the impact of an incident to be discovered.

5.2.8

Recovery Time
The Recovery Time of an incident is another modifier of the impact. As with the

immediacy of impact, the recovery time may be measured in any unit of time. A longer recovery
time would indicate a greater degree of impact on a system.
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5.2.9

Monetary Impact
The Monetary Impact of an incident is a measure of the cost of the incident to the victim.

The monetary impact is another modifier to the impact of the incident. It is an attempt to determine
both the hard recovery costs of an incident as well as the soft costs of lost revenues. Other factors
to the monetary impact may include fines and increased taxes.

5.2.10 Victim
The Victim of an incident denotes where an incident occurs. The victim may be the target
of a purposeful attack, or it may be the entity where an accident or failure occurs. The victim is
described in two ways. First, the victim is described by Victim Type. Second, the victim is
described according to the Market Sector which is impacted by the incident.

5.2.10.1 Victim Type
The Victim Type is similar to the Source Type category. The victim type is a general
description of the features of the entity where the incident occurs. The classifications within
Victim Type are the same as for Source Type.
Commercial – A Commercial victim type would denote that the incident occurred within
a business entity of some type. The commercial victim type includes retail, manufacturing,
industrial, and service enterprises along with similar entities. No consideration is given to the size
of a commercial victim.
Government – A Government victim type would indicate an incident occurred within
some form of national or local government.
Educational – An Educational victim type would be used to describe an incident that
affected any type of educational institution. This could include academic research conducted at
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an institute of higher education, or it may be an incident that occurred at any level of educational
institution.
Non-Profit Organization – A Non-Profit Organization victim type would be appropriate
for any registered non-profit organization. This would exclude commercial and government
institutions along with any unofficial entity.
Individual – An Individual victim type is used if an incident impacts a single individual.
Identified Group – An Identified Group victim type would indicate some sort of
identifiable conglomeration that is not an official entity.
Unknown – An Unknown victim type would be used if the location of an incident cannot
be identified.

5.2.10.2 Victim Market Sector
The Victim Market Sector is an attempt to identify the characteristics of the victim based
on the usage of CPSs. These market sectors have been identified based on general characteristics
of how CPSs are utilized within each sector. A victim may be classified in multiple market sectors.
The identified Victim Market Sectors are Utilities, Industrial Process Control, Health Care,
Transportation, Aerospace, Military, Consumer Electronics, Facilities Infrastructure, Agriculture,
Physical Access Control, Communications, Construction, and Entertainment Media Creation and
Distribution.
Utilities – The Utilities market sector is used to describe entities that are involved with
the production and distribution of energy; collection, treatment, and distribution of water; and
collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage among other activities.
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Industrial Process Control – The Industrial Process Control market sector is concerned
the oversight of industrial processes. This might include manufacturing, chemical production, and
other similar activities.
Health Care – The Health Care market sector provides for medical diagnosis and
treatment along with patient care. This sector encompasses hospitals, clinics, offices, and home
health care.
Transportation – The Transportation market sector is involved in the movement of
people and goods. This includes air, sea, and land based methods of transport. Navigation systems
for each of these areas are also included in the Transportation market sector.
Aerospace – The Aerospace market sector is used to identify above atmosphere systems.
This market sector includes space craft, satellites, and space stations. Ground stations that
communicate with these systems are also included.
Military – The Military market sector describes entities that are involved with systems
for military use. This includes weapons development, weapons control, and warning systems.
Consumer Electronics – The Consumer Electronics market sector includes the
development and use of devices that are designed to be used around the home or by an individual.
This market sector includes home automation systems, smart appliances, and mobile devices.
Facilities Infrastructure – The Facilities Infrastructure market sector encompasses the
management of buildings and campuses. Facilities infrastructure includes corporate, residential,
academic, and other types of facilities. This market sector includes building management and
environmental controls such as heating and air conditioning.
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Agriculture – The Agriculture market sector describes those entities that deal with the
growth, processing, and distribution of food supplies. Uses of CPSs in this market sector include
farm equipment, irrigation systems, food processing, and other applications.
Physical Access Control – The Physical Access Control market sector deals with the
industries that are sometimes referred to as security. The term physical access control is designed
to specify that the market sector focuses on physical security systems rather than cyber security
systems.
Communications – The Communications market sector describes those victims
concerned with voice, data, and video communications along with other communication
mediums.
Construction – The Construction market sector is involved with the design and building
of large projects. These could include buildings, roads, pipelines, and other types of facilities.
Entertainment Media Creation and Distribution – The Entertainment Media Creation
and Distribution market sector is concerned with the production and distribution of media. This
could include audio, video, and other forms of digital media. This market sector covers all of the
different types of equipment and systems that would be used in this creation and distribution.

5.2.11 Summary
The classification of incidents by Source Type, Means, Impact, and Victim allows for
practical analysis of incidents within a CPS. The sub-classification of Impact into Direct Impact,
Indirect Impact, Severity of Impact, Immediacy of Impact, Recovery Time, and Monetary Impact
makes it possible to conduct an impact oriented analysis of incidents. Classifying victims by their
type along with their market sector allows for a cross domain analysis of incidents. This level of

57

analysis, which is critical for CPS incidents, is not possible using any existing incident
taxonomies. Figure 5-1 presents a tree based view of the final taxonomy.

5.3

Cyber-Physical Systems Incident Database
The Cyber-Physical Systems Incident Database (CPSID) is hosted in the Brigham Young

University Cyber Security Research Lab. The server hosting the database has the following
configuration:
Operating System: Debian 7 (linux 3.2.0-4-amd64)
Database Management System: SQLite 3.8.4.3
Web Front-End: Django 1.6.1
The database is currently hosted on a non-routable IP Address. After the database and web
front-end have undergone a security evaluation, the web front-end will be made available at
https://cpsid.csrl.et.byu.edu.

5.4

CPSID Workflow
Unfortunately, due to the malicious intent of a relative few, it is necessary to perform some

sanitization of the public incident database to help minimize the risk of misuse. Two levels of
protection are implemented in the online database. The first is the sanitization of records; this
removes sensitive information and details from recorded incidents that may be misused. The
second level of protection we shall implement is access control and a requirement to register for
complete unsanitized access.

Users will be required to register with a valid institutional,

organizational, government, or recognized corporate domain. They will then be granted access
subject to a basic verification of their request.
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Figure 5-1: BYU-CPS Incident Taxonomy
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5.4.1

User Registration Workflow
The user registration workflow is illustrated in Figure 5-2.
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Should user have
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restricted info.?

No

Yes

User is placed in
appropriate access
group

Registration Process
completed

Figure 5-2: CPSID User Registration Workflow

When a new user accesses the CPSID website, they will be prompted to register. By
default, the user is placed in the All Users access group. Each registration request will be reviewed
by a member of the CSRL to determine if further access is warranted. The available access groups
are All Users, Authorized Users, Partners, Reviewers, and CSRL Admins. The Authorized Users
group is for those who have a need to access sensitive information that is not available to the
general public. The Partners group is for registered partners of the CSRL. These partners also
have access to some of the sensitive information contained in the database. The Reviewers group
is for authorized incident reviewers. Members of this group are responsible for reviewing the
information in an incident report and determining the classification of the incident along with
what information should be generally available and what should be restricted. The CSRL Admins
group is for the CSRL administrators who are responsible for maintaining the system and
assigning new incident reports to specific reviewers.
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5.4.2

Incident Workflow
The user registration workflow is designed to make sure users have access to only the

information appropriate for their level of access. There is a similar workflow for incident
information to make sure the information is placed in the appropriate categories. The incident
workflow is viewable in Figure 5-3.

New incident
submitted

Does incident
report contain
sensitive info.?

Incident In Review

Yes

No

Incident info. placed
in appropriate
access group

Incident Published

Figure 5-3: CPSID New Incident Workflow

When a new incident is submitted, it is only viewable by the submitter and the CSRL
Admins group. A CSRL Admin will assign each incident to a specific reviewer. At that point, the
incident is moved to the In Review status and is viewable by the assigned reviewer. The reviewer
will then classify the incident according to the incident taxonomy and determine which
information should be publicly available and which information is more sensitive. The sensitive
information will then be flagged so that it is only available to the appropriate groups. This
information could be flagged to be viewable by Authorized Users, Partners, or CSRL Members
only. CSRL Members will have access to all information. Partners will have access to information
in the Partners and Authorized Users groups. At this point, the incident is published according to
the restrictions determined by the reviewer.
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5.5

Framework Analysis and Observations
The proposed framework will provide a platform for studying CPS security incidents. This

section will discuss how each component of the framework contributes to the overall ability to
study these incidents.

5.5.1

BYU-CPS Incident Taxonomy
The taxonomy is the foundation for the proposed framework. The taxonomy is the

component that provides the ability to compare and contrast incidents in multiple categories. The
taxonomy can be useful in an overall comparison of CPS incidents; it is also useful for more
detailed analysis within a specific category.
One of the goals of this research was to provide the ability to perform a cross-domain
impact-oriented analysis of CPS incident. The proposed incident taxonomy provides the
foundation for being able to perform this type of analysis. The classification categories as defined
in the taxonomy have been selected and refined specifically for this purpose.
The initial plan was to use the database that has been developed to validate the taxonomy.
This was to be accomplished by adding incidents to the database and determining whether the
taxonomy categories as currently defined would describe each incident. Delays in the
development of the database dictated the use of a manual validation process rather than utilizing
the database.
The manual validation process proved to be of great benefit in the development of the
taxonomy. The manual process allowed for more rapid updating of the taxonomy as changes could
be made without the necessity of restructuring the database. Another benefit of the manual process
was the ability to compare the classification of incidents within the new taxonomy to the
classification of the same incidents using other available taxonomies.
62

The BYU-CPS Incident Taxonomy was validated by classifying the incidents as described
in Chapter 3. These incidents were classified utilizing the Howard and Longstaff taxonomy, the
Kjaerland taxonomy, and the AVOIDIT taxonomy. The results of these classifications were then
compared with the classification according to the BYU-CPS Incident Taxonomy. The results of
each classification are given here.
Hospital Malware
Howard and Longstaff Classification
Attackers – Vandals, Tool – Script or Program, Vulnerability – Configuration,
Action – Modify, Target – Process, Unauthorized Result – Denial of Service, Objectives
– Damage.
Kjaerland Classification
Source Sector – Unknown, Method of Operation – Virus, Impact – Disrupt, Target
Sector – Com.
AVOIDIT Classification
Attack Vector – Misconfiguration/Kernel Flaws, Operational Impact – Installed
Malware-Virus, Defense – Mitigation – Remove from Network, Remediation – Correct
Code, Informational Impact – Disrupt, Target – OS.
BYU-CPS Incident Taxonomy Classification
Source Type – Unknown, Means – Virus, Direct Impact – Service Disruption,
Indirect Impact – Loss of Trust, Severity of Impact – Primary Operations Degraded,
Immediacy of Impact – Unknown, Recovery Time – Unknown, Monetary Impact –
Unknown, Victim Type – Commercial, Victim Market Sector – Health Care.
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Airport Hack
Howard and Longstaff Classification
Attackers – Hackers, Tool – Script or Program, Vulnerability – Design, Action –
Modify, Target – Computer, Unauthorized Result – Denial of Service, Objectives –
Challenge, Status, Thrill.
Kjaerland Classification
Source Sector – User, Method of Operation – Root Compromise/Denial of Service,
Impact – Disrupt, Target – Gov.
AVOIDIT Classification
Attack Vector – Kernel Flaws, Operational Impact – Root Compromise, Defense
– Mitigation – Remove from Network, Remediation – Correct Code, Informational Impact
– Disrupt, Target – OS.
BYU-CPS Incident Taxonomy Classification
Source Type – Individual, Means – Root-level Resource Compromise, Direct
Impact – Service Disruption, Indirect Impact – Loss of Trust, Severity of Impact –
Secondary Operations Halted/Primary Operations Degraded, Immediacy of Impact –
Unknown, Recovery Time – Six hours, Monetary Impact – Unknown, Victim Type –
Government, Victim Market Sector – Transportation/Communications.
Pipeline Explosion
Howard and Longstaff Classification
This incident cannot be classified by Howard and Longstaff’s taxonomy.

64

Kjaerland Classification
Source Sector – Com/User, Method of Operation – Misuse of Resources, Impact
– Disrupt, Target Sector – Com.
AVOIDIT Classification
This incident cannot be classified by the AVOIDIT taxonomy.
BYU-CPS Incident Taxonomy Classification
Source Type – Commercial, Means – Misuse of Resources/Other System Failure,
Direct Impact – Physical Destruction/Environmental Destruction/Death/Serious Injury,
Indirect Impact – Loss of Reputation/Loss of Trust/Lost Business/Political
Repercussions/Public Response, Severity of Impact – Primary Operations Halted,
Immediacy of Impact – Immediate, Recovery Time – Years, Monetary Impact – $200
Million, Victim Type – Commercial/Individual, Victim Market Sector – Utilities/Industrial
Process Control.
Maroochy Water System
Howard and Longstaff Classification
Attackers – Hacker, Tool – User Command, Vulnerability – Implementation,
Action – Spoof, Target – Process, Unauthorized Result – Increased Access/Corruption of
Information, Objectives – Damage.
Kjaerland Classification
Source Sector – User, Method of Operation – Misuse of Resources/User
Compromise, Impact – Disrupt, Target Sector – Gov.
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AVOIDIT Classification
Attack Vector – Incorrect Permission, Operational Impact – Misuse of
Resources/User Compromise, Defense – Mitigation – Unknown, Remediation – Correct
Code, Informational Impact – Disrupt, Target – Application.
BYU-CPS Incident Taxonomy Classification
Source Type – Individual, Means – Misuse of Resources/User-level Resource
Compromise, Direct Impact – Service Disruption/Environmental Destruction, Indirect
Impact – Loss of Reputation/Political Repercussions, Severity of Impact – Primary
Operations Degraded, Immediacy of Impact – Months, Recovery Time – Months,
Monetary Impact – $50,000, Victim Type – Government, Victim Market Sector –
Utilities/Industrial Process Control.
Train System Virus
Howard and Longstaff Classification
Attackers – Vandals, Tool – Autonomous Agent, Vulnerability – Configuration,
Action – Modify, Target – Process, Unauthorized Result – Corruption of Information,
Objectives – Damage.
Kjaerland Classification
Source Sector – Unknown, Method of Operation – Virus, Impact – Disrupt, Target
Sector – Com.
AVOIDIT Classification
Attack Vector – Kernel Flaws/Incorrect Permission, Operational Impact –
Installed Malware-Virus-File Infector-Worm-Mass Mailing, Defense – Mitigation –
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Remove from Network, Remediation – Patch System, Informational Impact –
Distort/Disclosure, Target – User.
BYU-CPS Incident Taxonomy Classification
Source Type – Unknown, Means – Virus, Direct Impact – Service Disruption,
Indirect Impact – Loss of Reputation, Severity of Impact – Primary Operations Degraded,
Immediacy of Impact – Immediate, Recovery Time – 24 hours, Monetary Impact –
Unknown, Victim Type – Commercial, Victim Market Sector – Transportation.
Nuclear Power Plant Worm
Howard and Longstaff Classification
Attackers – Hackers, Tool – Autonomous Agent, Vulnerability – Configuration,
Action – Flood, Target – Network, Unauthorized Result – Denial of Service, Objectives –
Challenge, Status, Thrill.
Kjaerland Classification
Source Sector – Unknown, Method of Operation – Worm, Impact – Disrupt,
Target Sector – Com.
AVOIDIT Classification
Attack Vector – Buffer Overflow, Operational Impact – Denial of Service, Defense
– Mitigation – Remove from Network, Remediation – Patch System, Informational Impact
– Disrupt, Target – Application/Server/DB/MSSQL Server.
BYU-CPS Incident Taxonomy Classification
Source Type – Unknown, Means – Worm, Direct Impact – Service Disruption,
Indirect Impact – Loss of Reputation/Political Repercussions, Severity of Impact –
Secondary Operations Halted, Immediacy of Impact – 8 hours, Recovery Time – 6 hours,

67

Monetary Impact – Unknown, Victim Type – Commercial, Victim Market Sector –
Utilities/Industrial Process Control.
Stuxnet
Howard and Longstaff Classification
Attackers – Spies, Tool – Autonomous Agent, Vulnerability – Configuration,
Action – Modify, Target – Process, Unauthorized Result – Corruption of Information,
Objective – Political Gain/Damage.
Kjaerland Classification
Source Type – Intl, Method of Operation – Worm/Root Compromise/Trojan,
Impact – Disrupt/Distort, Target Sector – Gov.
AVOIDIT Classification
Attack

Vector

–

Misconfiguration,

Operational

Impact

–

Root

Compromise/Installed Malware – Trojan/Worm, Defense – Mitigation – Unknown,
Remediation – Unknown, Informational Impact – Distort/Disrupt, Target – Application.
BYU-CPS Incident Taxonomy Classification
Source

Type

–

Government,

Means

–

Root-level

Resource

Compromise/Trojan/Worm, Direct Impact – Service Disruption/Physical Destruction,
Indirect Impact – Political Repercussions, Severity of Impact – Primary Operations
Degraded, Immediacy of Impact – Unknown, Recovery Time – Unknown, Monetary
Impact – Unknown, Victim Type – Government, Victim Market Sector –
Utilities/Industrial Process Control/Military.
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Cellular Network Vehicle Attack
Howard and Longstaff Classification
Attackers – Not Defined, Tool – User Command, Vulnerability – Design, Action –
Spoof, Target – Component, Unauthorized Result – Disclosure of Information/Corruption
of Information, Objectives – Challenge, Status, Thrill.
Kjaerland Classification
Source Sector – Edu, Method of Operation – Misuse of Resources/Denial of
Service, Impact – Disrupt/Distort/Disclosure, Target Sector – Com.
AVOIDIT Classification
Attack Vector – Design Flaws/Insufficient Input Validation, Operational Impact –
Misuse of Resources/Denial of Service, Defense – Mitigation – None, Remediation –
None, Informational Impact – Distort/Disrupt/Disclosure, Target – Application.
BYU-CPS Incident Taxonomy Classification
Source Type – Educational, Means – Misuse of Resources/Denial of Service,
Direct Impact – Service Disruption/Information Disclosure, Indirect Impact – Loss of
Reputation/Loss of Trust, Severity of Impact – Secondary Operations Degraded/Primary
Operations Degraded, Immediacy of Impact –Unknown, Recovery Time – Unknown,
Monetary Impact – Unknown, Victim Type – Commercial, Victim Market Sector –
Transportation.
Summary of Classifications
The classification of each of these incidents utilizing each of these taxonomies is
summarized in the following tables. Table 5-1 provides a summary of classifications according to
Howard and Longstaff’s taxonomy.
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Table 5-1: Summary of Howard and Longstaff Classifications
Incident

Attackers

Tool

Vulnerability

Action

Target

Hospital
Malware
Airport
Hack
Pipeline
Explosion
Maroochy
Water
System
Train
System
Virus
Nuclear
Power
Plant
Worm
Stuxnet

Vandals

Script or
Program
Script or
Program
Undefined

Configuration

Modify

Process

Design

Modify

Undefined

Hackers

User
Command

Vandals

Cellular
Network
Vehicle
Attack

Unauthorized
Result

Objectives

Denial of Service

Damage

Computer

Denial of Service

Undefined

Undefined

Undefined

Challenge,
Status, Thrill
Undefined

Implementation

Spoof

Process

Damage

Autonomous
Agent

Configuration

Modify

Process

Increased Access,
Corruption of
Information
Corruption of
Information

Hackers

Autonomous
Agent

Configuration

Flood

Network

Denial of Service

Challenge,
Status, Thrill

Spies

Autonomous
Agent
User
Command

Configuration

Modify

Process

Design

Spoof

Component

Corruption of
Information
Disclosure of
Information,
Corruption of
Information

Political Gain,
Damage
Challenge,
Status, Thrill

Hackers
Undefined

Undefined

Damage

Table 5-2 presents the summary of classifications according to Kjaerland’s taxonomy.

Table 5-2: Summary of Kjaerland Classifications
Incident

Source Sector

Hospital Malware
Airport Hack

Unknown
User

Pipeline Explosion
Maroochy Water
System
Train System Virus
Nuclear Power Plant
Worm
Stuxnet

Com, User
User

Cellular Network
Vehicle Attack

Edu

Unknown
Unknown
Intl

Method of
Operation

Impact

Target Sector

Virus
Root Compromise,
Denial of Service
Misuse of Resources
Misuse of Resources,
User Compromise
Virus
Worm

Disrupt
Disrupt

Com
Gov

Disrupt
Disrupt

Com
Gov

Disrupt
Disrupt

Com
Com

Worm, Root
Compromise, Trojan
Misuse of Resources,
Denial of Service

Disrupt, Distort

Gov

Disrupt, Distort,
Disclosure

Com

Table 5-3 shows the summary of classifications of incidents utilizing the AVOIDIT
taxonomy.
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Table 5-3: Summary of AVOIDIT Classifications
Incident

Attack
Vector

Hospital
Malware
Airport Hack

Misconfiguration,
Kernel Flaws
Kernel Flaws

Pipeline
Explosion
Maroochy
Water System

Undefined

Train System
Virus

Incorrect
Permission
Kernel Flaws,
Incorrect
Permission
Buffer Overflow

Nuclear Power
Plant Worm
Stuxnet

Misconfiguration

Cellular
Network
Vehicle Attack

Design Flaws,
Insufficient Input
Validation

Operational
Impact

Mitigation

Remediation

Installed
Malware – Virus
Root
Compromise
Undefined

Remove from
Network
Remove from
Network
Undefined

Correct Code

Misuse of
Resources, User
Compromise
Installed
Malware – Virus
Denial of
Service
Root
Compromise,
Installed
Malware –
Trojan/Worm
Misuse of
Resources,
Denial of
Service

Informational
Impact

Target

Disrupt

OS

Correct Code

Disrupt

OS

Undefined

Undefined

Undefined

Unknown

Correct Code

Disrupt

Application

Remove from
Network

Patch System

Distort,
Disclosure

User

Remove from
Network
Unknown

Patch System

Disrupt

Application

Unknown

Distort, Disrupt

Application

None

None

Distort, Disrupt,
Disclosure

Application

Table 5-4 gives a summary of classifications utilizing the newly developed BYU-CPS
Incident Taxonomy.
This classification exercise shows the benefits of utilizing the proposed taxonomy in
classifying CPS incidents. An impact oriented approach to classification makes it possible to
identify the impacts of an incident on the physical environment of the system. This approach also
provides an ability to identify the interactions between cyber systems, physical systems,
environmental systems, and social systems.
The cross domain approach to classification provides the ability to identify the
interconnectedness of systems. There is no system that is completely isolated from everything
else. Systems developers and engineers often perceive of their system as a stand-alone system
without consideration for how the system interacts with other systems. The cross domain approach
illustrates the flaws in this type of view. All systems are connected with other systems and those
interactions and their consequences should be considered in any system design.
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Table 5-4: Summary of BYU-CPS Incident Taxonomy Classifications
Incident

Source
Type

Means

Direct
Impact

Indirect
Impact

Severity
of Impact

Victim
Type

Hospital
Malware

Unknown

Virus

Service
Disruption

Loss of Trust

Commercial

Health Care

Airport
Hack

Individual

Root-level
Resource
Compromise

Service
Disruption

Loss of Trust

Government

Transportation,
Communications

Pipeline
Explosion

Commercial

Misuse of
Resources,
Other System
Failure

Physical
Destruction,
Environmental
Destruction,
Death/Serious
Injury

Commercial,
Individual

Utilities,
Industrial
Process Control

Maroochy
Water
System

Individual

Service
Disruption,
Environmental
Destruction

Primary
Operations
Degraded

Government

Utilities,
Industrial
Process Control

Train
System
Virus
Nuclear
Power Plant
Worm

Unknown

Misuse of
Resources,
User-level
Resource
Compromise
Virus

Loss of
Reputation,
Loss of Trust,
Lost Business,
Political
Repercussions,
Public
Response
Loss of
Reputation,
Political
Repercussions

Primary
Operations
Degraded
Secondary
Operations
Halted,
Primary
Operations
Degraded
Primary
Operations
Halted

Service
Disruption

Loss of
Reputation

Commercial

Transportation

Unknown

Worm

Service
Disruption

Commercial

Utilities,
Industrial
Process Control

Stuxnet

Government

Government

Educational

Service
Disruption,
Physical
Destruction
Service
Disruption,
Information
Disclosure

Primary
Operations
Degraded

Cellular
Network
Vehicle
Attack

Root-level
Resource
Compromise,
Trojan, Worm
Misuse of
Resources,
Denial of
Service

Loss of
Reputation,
Political
Repercussions
Political
Repercussions

Primary
Operations
Degraded
Secondary
Operations
Halted

Secondary
Operations
Degraded,
Primary
Operations
Degraded

Commercial

Utilities,
Industrial
Process Control,
Military
Transportation

5.5.2

Loss of
Reputation,
Loss of Trust

Victim
Market
Sector

Cyber-Physical Systems Incident Database
An analysis of CPS incidents requires us to have information about each of these incidents.

This is the role of the CPSID. The CPSID is designed to be a repository for all available
information about known CPS incidents. An issue with this type of repository is the security of
the information contained within the repository. There are some who would attempt to access the
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information within the repository for malicious purposes. The repository must be made secure to
minimize the risk that sensitive information will be made available to the wrong people.

5.5.3

CPSID Workflow
The CPSID workflow is designed to aid with the security of the CPSID. The user

registration workflow allows for users to be assigned to groups that provide access to the
information they require while restricting access to more sensitive information. The incident
workflow is designed to place information about each incident in the proper categories to allow
information to be available only to those who have a need to access it. While it is acknowledged
that no system is completely secure, the CPSID workflow is designed to make the information
contained within the database as secure as possible while still making it available to those with a
legitimate need for access.

5.6

Chapter Summary
The proposed framework has three components: the BYU-CPS Incident Taxonomy, the

Cyber-Physical Systems Incident Database, and the CPSID Workflow. These components are
designed to work together to consolidate information about CPS incidents and provide that
information to those who need it. These components are also designed to make sensitive
information about incidents secure and unavailable to those who would use the information
maliciously.
The proposed taxonomy was validated through classifying several CPS incidents. These
same incidents were classified using other available taxonomies to provide a comparison. This
validation and comparison exercise identified the benefits of using the proposed taxonomy in
classifying CPS incidents.
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6

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1

Introduction
This chapter will provide an analysis of each of the research questions and hypotheses

presented in Chapter 1. A discussion of how each question and hypothesis was answered will be
presented. Some recommendations and plans for future work will also be presented. Finally, this
chapter will summarize what has been achieved through this research.

6.2

Conclusions
The research questions and hypothesis were presented in three general questions:

Taxonomy Categories, Suitable Methods for Measuring the Impact of an Incident, and Identifiable
Benefits. Each of these will be discussed in turn.

6.2.1

Taxonomy Categories
A new incident taxonomy that is focused on CPS incidents has been created. This

taxonomy is designed to allow a cross domain, impact oriented analysis of incidents. The cross
domain analysis provides insights into how systems interact with each other. This analysis is
provided through the use of market sectors in the classification of incidents. The impact oriented
approach identifies the effects an incident has not only on the system where the incident occurs
but also on the surrounding environment.
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The creation of a new taxonomy for classifying CPS incidents identified the categories
that would allow for cross domain analysis of incidents. These categories are Victim Type and
Victim Market Sector. The Victim Type category provides a description of the general
characteristics of the victim of an incident. This description allows for analysis based on these
types. The Victim Market Sector category provides detail for the sector in which a victim is
involved. This detail demonstrates the cross domain nature of CPSs and the interconnectedness
of these systems. The cross domain analysis of incidents shows that no system operates in
isolation. Every system is connected to other systems whether cyber, physical, environmental, or
social.
The new taxonomy also provides categories for an impact oriented analysis of incidents.
The Direct Impact category defines the impacts an incident can have on the CPS and on the
surrounding environment. This surrounding environment includes the entity that operates the
CPS, the people who live around the CPS, and the natural environment. The Indirect Impact
category provides a view into the long-term effects an incident has on the entity that operates the
CPS. These long-term effects are often overlooked in the analysis of an incident. The modifiers
of Immediacy of Impact, Recovery Time, and Monetary Impact also provide insight into effects
of an incident that many times go unnoticed.
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 answer Q1 “What taxonomy categories will allow for cross domain
analysis of incidents?” as Victim Type and Victim Market Sector. The victim type allows for
analysis according to general characteristics of the victim. The victim market sector allows for
analysis based on the domain of a victim and how that domain may be perceived by different
people.
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Chapters 3, 4, and 5 answer Q2 “What taxonomy categories will allow for an impact
oriented analysis of incidents?” as Direct Impact and Indirect Impact with modifiers for
Immediacy of Impact, Recovery Time, and Monetary Impact. The direct impact category provides
information about the immediate effects of an incident. The indirect impact category provides
insight into the long-term consequences of an incident. The modifiers provide methods for
comparing these immediate and long-term effects across incidents.

6.2.2

Suitable Methods for Measuring the Impact of an Incident
The ability to measure the impact of an incident is always difficult. Most measures rely

on some form of Low/Medium/High scale of severity. The newly created taxonomy modifies this
scale to make it more appropriate for CPSs. The modified scale classifies the severity of an impact
as Inconvenience, Secondary Operations Degraded, Secondary Operations Halted, Primary
Operations Degraded, and Primary Operations Halted. This scale provides a general low severity
(Inconvenience). The medium and high severities are divided between primary and secondary
operations.
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 answer H1 “Suitable methods for measuring the impact of an incident
currently exist.” as true. A Low/Medium/High scale is generally suitable for measuring the impact
of an incident.
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 answer H2 “Currently available methods can be adapted for use in
CPS incidents.” as true. The Low/Medium/ High scale can be modified as Inconvenience,
Secondary Operations Degraded, Secondary Operations Halted, Primary Operations Degraded,
and Primary Operations Halted to account for the unique nature of CPS incidents.
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6.2.3

Identifiable Benefits
The benefits of doing cross domain, impacted oriented analysis of incidents were

identified by classifying a representative sample of incidents utilizing different taxonomies. The
results of this classification exercise were compared to the newly created taxonomy to provide an
analysis of benefits of the new classification system.
A cross domain classification system provides the ability to understand how a system does
not reside in a single domain. Most systems are designed with a single domain in mind, but these
domains are interconnected in ways that are often not understood or overlooked. It is impossible
to isolate a system to a single domain. Cross domain analysis shows us not only how systems are
connected to and interact with each other, but also how a system that may be perceived to be in
one domain could also be perceived to be in another domain depending on one’s point of view.
An impact oriented approach to classifying incidents provides insight into the effects an
incident has on the system and surrounding environment. In a CPS, the surrounding environment
includes the physical aspects of the system, the natural environment the system is located in, and
the social environment of the community where the system resides. An incident within a CPS
impacts all of these environments. An impact oriented approach also provides means for analyzing
the long term effects of an incident on the entity that operates the CPS. These long term effects
may drastically change the way the entity operates in the future.
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 answer Q3 “What are the identifiable benefits of a cross domain
classification system?” as: Cross domain analysis provides insights into the interconnectedness of
CPSs and that systems may be perceived to be in different domains based on the point of view of
the observer.

77

Chapters 3, 4, and 5 answer Q4 “What are the identifiable benefits of an impact oriented
classification system?” as: An impact oriented approach to classification provides insight into the
immediate and long-term effects of an incident on the entity where the incident occurs and the
surrounding environment.

6.3

Recommendations
This research has provided a taxonomy that is suitable for classifying incidents within a

CPS. A database to catalog these incidents based on the new taxonomy has also been created.
This database has been designed to be a publicly available repository of information about CPS
incidents that is freely available for academic research. A beginning set of incidents has been
classified and added to this database. The maintenance of this database should be an ongoing
effort of the Brigham Young University Cyber Security Research Lab.
This research has been focused on the development of the incident taxonomy and
repository. No attempt has been made to analyze the contents of the database. A methodology for
analyzing the contents of the database needs to be developed. This analysis should focus on
identifying trends, commonalities, and differences in these incidents. This analysis should provide
understanding into how CPS incidents happen and how they can be prevented.
Understanding that it is impossible to prevent all possible incidents, steps need to be taken
to minimize the occurrence of incidents and the impact these incidents have. The analysis of
incidents included in this database should be used to develop these methodologies for minimizing
both the occurrence and impact of CPS incidents. Above all, these methodologies should focus
on protecting the people and the environment that surround these systems.
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6.3.1

Future Work
The initial goal of this work was to complete the CPSID and make it publicly available.

Development delays have made this goal unattainable at this time. The database has been
developed and is currently being populated with incidents. The web front end still needs to be
developed and undergo a comprehensive security evaluation. After the evaluation, the front end
will be modified to correct any issues that are discovered. The web front end will then be made
available. Once available, the CPSID will need to be marketed to encourage adoption within the
academic and research communities. Efforts will also need to be made to encourage industry
participation in the CPSID.
The proposed framework provides a foundation for studying CPS incidents. The
framework as proposed will require ongoing maintenance. As new incidents are discovered, they
will need to be added to the database. New incidents may have characteristics that require the
BYU-CPS Incident Taxonomy to be updated to maintain relevance. Incidents already cataloged
in the database will need to be updated as new information becomes available. Ongoing review
of those who have access to the CPSID will also be required to maintain security. There will also
be a need to maintain the infrastructure supporting the CPSID (Hardware, Operating Systems,
Applications, etc.) to ensure continued support and security.
This framework could be extended to provide statistical analysis of incidents contained in
the CPSID. This analysis could then be used to develop best practices for security within a CPS.
These best practices should include both design and implementation considerations for a CPS.
The best practices should then be adopted by industry as they build new CPSs and improve
existing ones.
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The overall goal of this research is to make the use of CPSs more safe and secure. The
achievement of this goal will require a collaborative effort between academic researchers and
industry. The CPSID should be used as an instrument to facilitate this collaboration. The
collaborative efforts of academia and industry will provide the knowledge of security flaws within
CPSs along with the expertise to fix those flaws and create a safer and more secure product for
the end users and the surrounding communities.

6.4

Achievements of this Research
This research began as an attempt to document several cyber-security incidents involving

SCADA and Critical Infrastructure. This attempt led to the discovery that currently available
incident taxonomies were insufficient for analyzing incidents involving a CPS. The first
achievement of this research is the production of a new taxonomy that is focused solely on CPS
incidents. This new taxonomy provides several benefits over currently existing taxonomies when
it comes to classifying incidents that involve a CPS:
•

The newly developed taxonomy provides the ability to analyze the impacts of an
incident with a unique view to CPSs. A CPS incident involves the physical world
along with the cyber-component. This taxonomy provides methods for analyzing
these physical impacts along with the cyber impacts that currently available
taxonomies address.

•

The newly developed taxonomy provides the ability to perform a cross-domain
analysis of incidents. The inclusion of market sectors in the taxonomy allows for
a researcher to see how a single incident may impact multiple domains. It also
provides the ability to see if similar incidents have different impacts based on the
domain of the system in which the incident occurs.
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This research has also developed the CPSID. The CPSID is a repository for information
about incidents involving CPSs. The benefits of the CPSID as defined in this research are:
•

The CPSID provides information on incidents in all areas of CPS. It is not
focused solely on Critical Infrastructure or SCADA systems as the currently
available databases are.

•

The CPSID is freely available for academic research. This overcomes the barrier
of having to pay thousands of US dollars per year for access to information about
these incidents.

In conclusion, this research has provided a solution to the problem as stated in Chapter 1.
This research has produced a cross-domain impact-oriented classification system and database
that are freely available for academic research into CPS incidents.

81

REFERENCES
Blackwell, Clive. 2010. “A Security Ontology for Incident Analysis.” In Proceedings of the
Sixth Annual Workshop on Cyber Security and Information Intelligence Research CSIIRW ’10, 1. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press. doi:10.1145/1852666.1852717.
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1852666.1852717.
Checkoway, Stephen, Damon McCoy, Brian Kantor, Danny Anderson, Hovav Shacham, Stefan
Savage, Karl Koscher, Alexei Czeskis, Franziska Roesner, and Tadayoshi Kohno. 2011.
“Comprehensive Experimental Analyses of Automotive Attack Surfaces.” In Proceedings
of the 20th USENIX Conference on Security, 6. Berkeley, CA, USA: USENIX Association.
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2028067.2028073.
“CVE - Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE).” http://cve.mitre.org/.
Denning, Dorothy E. 2000. “Cyberterrorism: The Logic Bomb versus the Truck Bomb - Centre
for World Dialogue.” Global Dialogue 2 (4).
http://www.worlddialogue.org/content.php?id=111.
Farwell, James P., and Rafal Rohozinski. 2011. “Stuxnet and the Future of Cyber War.”
Survival 53 (1) (February): 23–40. doi:10.1080/00396338.2011.555586.
Hansman, Simon, and Ray Hunt. 2005. “A Taxonomy of Network and Computer Attacks.”
Computers & Security 24 (1): 31–43.
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167404804001804.
Helps, Richard, and Francis Mensah. 2012. “Comprehensive Design of Cyber Physical
Systems.” In Proceedings of the 13th Annual Conference on Information Technology
Education (SIGITE ’12), 233–238. New York, New York, USA: ACM.
http://sigite2012.sigite.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/session16-paper03.pdf.
Howard, John D., and Thomas A. Longstaff. 1998. “A Common Language for Computer
Security Incidents.” Sandia Report: SAND98-8667, … (October).
http://prod.sandia.gov/techlib/access-control.cgi/1998/988667.pdf.
Kjaerland, Maria. 2006. “A Taxonomy and Comparison of Computer Security Incidents from
the Commercial and Government Sectors.” Computers & Security 25 (7) (October): 522–
538. doi:10.1016/j.cose.2006.08.004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2006.08.004.

82

Miller, Bill, and Dale Rowe. 2012. “A Survey of SCADA and Critical Infrastructure Incidents.”
In Proceedings of the 1st Annual Conference on Research in Information Technology RIIT ’12, 51–56. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press. doi:10.1145/2380790.2380805.
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=2380790.2380805.
Mirkovic, Jelena, and Peter Reiher. 2004. “A Taxonomy of DDoS Attack and DDoS Defense
Mechanisms.” ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review 34 (2) (April 1): 39.
doi:10.1145/997150.997156. http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=997150.997156.
Mustard, Steve. 2005. “Security of Distributed Control Systems: The Concern Increases.”
Computing & Control Engineering Journal. doi:10.1049/ccej:20050605.
Nicholson, Andrew, Stuart Webber, Shaun Dyer, Tanuja Patel, and Helge Janicke. 2012.
“SCADA Security in the Light of Cyber-Warfare.” Computers & Security 31 (4) (March):
436–418. doi:10.1016/j.cose.2012.02.009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2012.02.009.
OWASP. “OWASP Risk Rating Methodology.”
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Risk_Rating_Methodology.
Ozdemir, Engin, and Mevlut Karacor. 2006. “Mobile Phone Based SCADA for Industrial
Automation.” ISA Transactions 45 (1) (January): 67–75. doi:10.1016/S00190578(07)60066-4. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0019057807600664.
Poovendran, Radha. 2010. “Cyber–Physical Systems: Close Encounters Between Two Parallel
Worlds [Point of View].” Proceedings of the IEEE 98 (8) (August): 1363–1366.
doi:10.1109/JPROC.2010.2050377.
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=5512708.
Poulsen, Kevin. 2003. “Slammer Worm Crashed Ohio Nuke Plant Network.” Security Focus,
August. http://www.securityfocus.com/news/6767.
Rajkumar, Ragunathan (Raj), Insup Lee, Lui Sha, and John Stankovic. 2010. “Cyber-Physical
Systems.” In Proceedings of the 47th Design Automation Conference on - DAC ’10, 731.
New York, New York, USA: ACM Press. doi:10.1145/1837274.1837461.
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1837274.1837461.
RISI. 2014. “RISI - The Repository of Industrial Security Incidents.” Accessed May 2.
http://securityincidents.org/.
Simmons, Chris, Sajjan Shiva, Dipankar Dasgupta, and Qishi Wu. 2009. “AVOIDIT: A Cyber
Attack Taxonomy.” University of Memphis, Technical Report CS-09-003.
http://si.lopesgazzani.com.br/docentes/marcio/SegApp/CyberAttackTaxonomy_IEEE_Mag
.pdf.

83

Sveen, Finn Olav, Jose M Sarriegi, Eliot Rich, and Jose J Gonzalez. 2007. “Toward Viable
Information Security Reporting Systems.” Information Management & Computer Security
15 (5): 408–419. http://search.proquest.com/docview/212305977?accountid=4488.
Talbot, David. 2012. “Computer Viruses Are ‘Rampant’ on Medical Devices in Hospitals.”
Technology Review. http://www.technologyreview.com/news/429616/computer-virusesare-rampant-on-medical-devices/.
Tsang, Rose. 2012. “Cyberthreats, Vulnerabilities and Attacks on SCADA Networks.” Accessed
June 5. http://gspp.berkeley.edu/iths/Tsang_SCADA Attacks.pdf.
US-CERT. 2014. “US-CERT | United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team.” Accessed
January 5. http://www.us-cert.gov/.
Weaver, Nicholas, Vern Paxson, Stuart Staniford, and Robert Cunningham. 2003. “A
Taxonomy of Computer Worms.” In Proceedings of the 2003 ACM Workshop on Rapid
Malcode - WORM’03, 11. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press.
doi:10.1145/948187.948190. http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=948187.948190.
Zhu, Bonnie, Anthony Joseph, and Shankar Sastry. 2011. “A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on
SCADA Systems.” In 2011 International Conference on Internet of Things and 4th
International Conference on Cyber, Physical and Social Computing, 380–388. IEEE.
doi:10.1109/iThings/CPSCom.2011.34.
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=6142258.

84

APPENDICES

85

APPENDIX A.

AFFINITY DIAGRAM TECHNIQUE FOR TAXONOMY
REFINEMENT

After the initial taxonomy was created, the results were brought before the research group
for further refinement. This refinement utilized an affinity diagram technique where each member
of the group wrote comments about the different categories within the taxonomy. These notes
were then discussed to determine the changes that were needed. The notes from this exercise may
be seen in the following figures.
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APPENDIX B.

SUMMARY OF CLASSIFICATION DISTRIBUTIONS

The following figures represent the distribution of classifications according to the Howard
and Longstaff taxonomy.
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Vandals

Hackers
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Spies
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Implementation
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Network

Component
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Undefined

Political Gain

The following graphs present the distribution of classifications according to Kjaerland’s
taxonomy.
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The following charts display the distribution of classifications when utilizing the
AVOIDIT taxonomy.
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Undefined

Unknown

None

AVOIDIT Remediations
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
Correct Code

Patch System

Undefined
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Unknown

None

AVOIDIT Informational Impacts
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Disrupt

Undefined

Distort

Disclosure

AVOIDIT Targets
4.5
4
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
OS

Undefined

Application
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User

The following figures present the distribution of classifications according to the new
taxonomy.

BYU-CPS Incident Taxonomy Source Types
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
Unkown

Individual

Commercial

Government

BYU-CPS Incident Taxonomy Means
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
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Educational

BYU-CPS Incident Taxonomy Direct Impacts
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Service
Disruption

Physical
Destruction

Environmental
Destruction

Death/Serious
Injury

Information
Disclosure

BYU-CPS Incident Taxonomy Indirect Impacts
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Loss of Trust

Loss of
Reputation

Lost Business
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Political
Repercussions

Public Response

BYU-CPS Incident Taxonomy Severities of Impact
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Primary Operations Secondary Operations Primary Operations Secondary Operations
Degraded
Degraded
Halted
Halted

BYU-CPS Incident Taxonomy Victim Types
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Commercial

Government
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Individual

BYU-CPS Incident Taxonomy Victim Market
Sectors
4.5
4
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0

104

